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New Zealand’s (NZ’s) investment in R & D activities as percentage of GDP has remained near 
the bottom of OECD member countries.  Efforts to improve this level have involved various 
targeted grants, tax credits (twice), and cashing out of R & D losses (a form of government 
loan), and have ebbed and flowed with the changes in government.  This paper reviews NZ’s 
approach from the early 2000s to the latest tax credit scheme that took effect in 2019.  It reveals 
that the level of uncertainty, frequent change and political philosophies has done little to 
encourage businesses to take risks through increasing their investment in R & D.   




*  Professor of Taxation, UC Business School, University of Canterbury, Christchurch New Zealand.  Email: 
adrian.sawyer@canterbury.ac.nz. This paper states the position with respect to the incentives for R & D in 
New Zealand as at 29 February 2020.  It has significantly benefited from the contributions of attendees at 
the ATTA Conference held during January 2020 in Hobart, Tasmania.  Any remaining errors remain those 
of the author. 
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“We do not learn from experience… we learn from reflecting on experience”, John Dewey 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The New Zealand (NZ) government has, on numerous occasions, sought to stimulate research 
and development (R & D) investment through statutory intervention.  The objective of this 
paper is to assess the implications of providing tax incentives for R & D expenditure.  This will 
be undertaken through a case study focussing on one jurisdiction, New Zealand (NZ).  To set 
the scene, in NZ with respect to incentivising investment in R &D activities, eligible R&D 
activities must:1 
a) systematic, investigative and experimental activities (SIE) that are performed for the 
purposes of acquiring new knowledge or creating new or improved materials, products, 
devices, processes or services and that: 
 are intended to advance science or technology through the resolution of scientific 
or technological uncertainty; or 
 involve an appreciable element of novelty.  
b) other activities that are wholly or mainly for the purpose of, required for, and integral 
to, the carrying on of the activities in paragraph (a). 
While this definition applies for taxation purposes, a much bigger question (which is beyond 
the scope of this paper) is just what is R & D from an accounting perspective?  Does investment 
 
1  Section LH 7 of the Income Tax Act 2007 (NZ) (ITA).  This is the definition that applies for eligibility for 
the new R & D tax credit that came in with effect from the 2019-20 income year.  
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in R & D create an asset or is it an expense.  For these purposes guidance is found in applicable 
accounting standards, including NZ IAS 38.2 
According to Statistics NZ, in 2018:3 
 Total R & D expenditure increased 24 percent from 2016, to $3.9 billion. 
 R & D expenditure by businesses reached over $2.1 billion, accounting for 55 percent 
of total R & D expenditure. 
 R & D expenditure by service industries increased $534 million (64 percent) from 2016, 
and 
 R & D expenditure as a proportion of GDP was 1.37 percent. 
Putting this information into perspective, the OECD average in 2018 for R & D expenditure 
was 2.37 percent of GDP.4  This indicates that NZ is only achieving R & D investment at 58 
percent of the OECD average.  Notwithstanding efforts to increase the level of investment, NZ 
consistently falls well below the OECD average for R & D investment.  This is a state of affairs 
that cannot be permitted to continue if NZ wishes to improve its productivity, GDP and overall 
net wealth per capita.  
 
2  Under section DB 26 ITA, an item of expenditure will be deductible for taxation purposes in accordance 
with the accounting standards provided in Financial Reporting Standard (FRS) FRS-13, paragraph 5.3.  With 
NZ adopting International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS), FRS-13 is superseded by NZ IAS 38, an 
accounting standard on intangibles also governs the accounting treatment for R & D expenditure. NZ IAS 
38 paragraph 57 provides that expenditure on R&D is recognised as an expense when it is incurred unless 
the criteria for recognition of development expenditure as an intangible asset are satisfied. Although these 
criteria are worded differently from those in FRS-13, the new standards are largely consistent with the old 
standards. 
3  See further: https://www.stats.govt.nz/information-releases/research-and-development-survey-2018. 
4  See further: https://data.oecd.org/rd/gross-domestic-spending-on-r-d.htm. 
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How has the NZ government responded on behalf of the country to this relatively ‘poor 
performance’? In addition to clarifying the definitions of “research” and “development” 
(including reducing the levels of black hole expenditure5), NZ has frequently intervened 
through targeted legislation and setting up of various Crown entities.  These interventions 
include:  
 Creating a tax credit (twice, the first in 2008, the second in 2019);6  
 Enabling certain businesses with losses to cash out their R & D tax credit, and  
 Setting up a grants-based scheme administered by a government agency (currently 
Callaghan Innovation). 7 
New Zealand’s journey is characterised by disparate political views and frequent legislative 
change.  Complex challenges for businesses (especially small business) in understanding and 
taking advantage of the support provided by government abound.  Frequent changes in 
eligibility criteria and level of funding have exacerbated the situation.  Uncertainty, 
accompanied by change, is the prevailing theme. 
It is moot as to whether the most recent changes in 2019 will enable NZ’s R & D tax regime to 
be more internationally competitive.  The Taxation (Research and Development Tax Credits) 
 
5  Black hole expenditure is business expenditure that is expected to result in an economic cost to a taxpayer, 
but is neither immediately deductible for tax purposes, nor deductible over time. It is not deductible over 
time because it does not form part of the cost of depreciable property for tax purposes.  Thus it refers 
principally to situations where taxpayers would have received depreciation deductions had a project gone 
ahead (because the asset was expected to decline in value), but did not because the project was abandoned 
before it met the definition of depreciable property.  See further: Steven Joyce and Judith Collins, Black hole 
and feasibility expenditure: a Government discussion document (Inland Revenue, May 2017). 
6  The first tax credit, created under a Labour-led Government, operated for one year before the incoming 
National-led Government repealed it.  The second scheme was introduced by the new Labour-led 
Government in 2018 with effect from 1 April 2019. 
7  Callaghan Innovation states that it “… provide[s] a single front door to the innovation system for businesses 




Act 2019 reintroduced a 15 percent tax credit with effect from 1 April 2019.  Further 
modifications to the refundability of R & D tax credits are contained in the Taxation 
(KiwiSaver, Student Loans, and Remedial Matters) Bill 2019, which is expected to be enacted 
later in 2020.8   
Furthermore, more generally, debate is far from settled as to whether R & D incentives actually 
do have an impact in increasing investment in R & D activities.9  The mere existence of fiscal 
incentives may not in themselves be sufficient to stimulate R & D investment; more may be 
needed, including appropriate design and collection of data.  If fiscal incentives are considered 
desirable, the author’s view, as will be expended upon in the paper, is a clear preference for 
interventions by way of tax incentives with clear guidelines for all qualifying entities (such as 
through tax credits), over limited grants that may be available to selected enterprises upon 
application based upon limited guidance developed by government officials. 
The importance of public policy and its influence on R & D should not be underestimated, as 
noted in a recent OECD study:10 
 
8  At the time of writing the Bill has been reported back to Parliament following the hearing of submissions.  
No date has been set for its second reading.  A number of points raised by submitters have been accepted by 
Officials or have been recommended that the point(s) raised be noted. 
9  See for example, Silvia Appelt, Matej Bajgar, Chiara Criscuolo, and Fernando Galindo-Rueda, “R&D Tax 
Incentives: Evidence on design, incidence and impacts”, OECD Science, Technology and Industry Policy 
Papers, No. 32, (OECD Publishing, Paris, 2016); Irem Guceri and Li Lu, “Effectiveness of Fiscal Incentives 
for R&D: Quasi-experimental Evidence” (2019) 11(1) American Economic Journal: Economic Policy 266-
291; and Lucy Minford and David Meenagh, “Testing a Model of UK growth: A role for R&D subsidies” 
(2019) 82 Economic Modelling 152-16.  See also Hanna Spinova and Theodoros Rapanos, R&D tax 
incentives Do R&D tax incentives stimulate innovations and economic growth? Evidence of OECD 
countries, Working Paper, Södertörns högskola | Institutionen för Samhällsvetenskaper (18 January 2019) 
and Petr Svoboda, “The Impact of Tax Incentives on Research and Development” (2017) 65(2) Acta 
Universitatis Agriculturae et Silviculturae Mendelianae Brunensis, 737–743 (tax incentives are a more 
effective form of research and development support than direct government funding). 
10  Tom Neubig, Fernando Galindo-Rueda, Silvia Appelt, Chiara Criscuolo, and Matej Bajgar “Fiscal incentives 
for R&D and innovation in a diverse world”, OECD Taxation Working Papers No 27, (September 2016) at 
5 (emphasis added). 
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“Public policy has an important role to play in promoting research and development 
(R&D) the development, diffusion, and use of new knowledge and innovations. Fiscal 
incentives, including tax policies, should be directed at specific barriers, impediments or 
synergies to facilitate the desired level of investment in R&D and innovations. Without 
careful design, policies can have unintended consequences such as favouring incumbent 
firms, encouraging small firms to undertake less efficient activities, or creating arbitrage 
and rent-seeking activity. R&D tax policy needs to be considered in the context of the 
country’s general tax policies, its broader innovation policy mix and its other R&D 
support policies. More R&D activity in one country does not necessarily result in an 
overall increase in global innovation if it is simply shifted from another country. More 
research is needed to determine the extent to which R&D fiscal incentives in one country 
increase overall R&D, the quality of that R&D, and its positive spillovers to other sectors 
of the economy and other countries.” 
A further argument is that the presence of a capital gains tax (CGT) assists in encouraging 
investment in R & D type activities as it provides an avenue for allowing offsetting of capital 
losses against other forms of capital gains.11  New Zealand, as a member of the OECD, is the 
only country without a formal CGT.12  This could in part explain why there is a lower level of 
investment in R & D activities, since any capital losses arising from R & D activities are unable 
 
11  See for example, Mark Bowler-Smith, “New Zealand National IFA Branch Report: Tax Incentives on 
Research and Development”, Cahiers de Droit Fiscal International, Volume 100a, (International Fiscal 
Association, 2014).  Bowler-Smith suggests the absence of a CGT in NZ may be to the country’s benefit in 
promoting investment in R & D activities.  
12  Attempts to develop a CGT for NZ were made with the Tax Working Group established by the NZ 
Government in 2017.  Its proposal for a CGT included in its Final Report in February 2019 was rejected by 
the Labour-led Government in April 2019.  See Grant Robertson and Stuart Nash, “Govt responds to Tax 




to be offset against capital gains (there being no liability to tax for such gains unless they are 
caught under various income tax criteria).13 
Fiscal support for R & D activities in NZ is premised upon a neo-liberal culture that assumes 
best outcomes from support funding is achieved through contestable means.14  This approach 
pits researcher(s) against researcher(s), necessitating that they implicitly at least advocate why 
their proposed research should be funded at the expense of others.  There is also a very limited 
‘pot’ from which projects can be funded.  This approach applies to research funding generally, 
such as the elite Marsden Fund for researchers, along with more generally the Performance 
Based Research Fund (PBRF).15  This approach is also present in the R & D context in NZ with 
the Callaghan Innovation grants funding mechanism, discussed in section 3 of the paper.  There 
would appear to be minimal chance that this underlying philosophy of promoting competition 
will change for the foreseeable future. 
The perspective taken in this paper is largely positivist, in that it reviews political interventions 
to encourage investment in R & D activities.  Normative suggestions are also offered in 
interpreting the effects of these interventions.  The paper takes a policy perspective, drawing 
upon documentary analysis of various scholars and commentators that offer insights into the R 
 
13  For recent discussion on the taxation of certain capital gains in NZ, see Chris Evans and Richard Krever, 
“Taxing Capital Gains: A Comparative Analysis and Lessons for New Zealand” (2017) 23(4) New Zealand 
Journal of Taxation Law and Policy 486-515; and Kerrie Sadiq and Adrian Sawyer, “New Zealand’s 
‘experience’ with capital gains taxation and policy choice lessons from Australia”, (2019) 16(2) e-Journal 
of Tax Research 362-392. 
14  For discussion on the implications of this approach, see for example, Branko Marcetic, “New Zealand’s 
Neoliberal Drift”, Jacobin (2016); available at: https://www.jacobinmag.com/2017/03/new-zealand-
neoliberalism-inequality-welfare-state-tax-haven/.  See more generally, Kelly Freebody, Molly Mullen, 
Amber Walls and Peter O’Connor, “Who is Responsible? Neoliberal Discourses of Well-Being in Australia 
and New Zealand” (2018) 42(2) NJ Drama Australia Journal, 139-153. 
15  See https://www.royalsociety.org.nz/what-we-do/funds-and-opportunities/marsden. See further: 
https://www.tec.govt.nz/funding/funding-and-performance/funding/fund-finder/performance-based-
research-fund/.  See also, Leon Benade, Nesta Devine and Georgina Stewart, “The 2019 PBRF Review: 
What’s to be done?” (2019) 54 New Zealand Journal of Educational Studies, 225–228. 
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& D interventions.  The paper does not attempt to analyse legislation and regulations in detail, 
and as a consequence, does not utilise blackletter law analysis techniques.   
The paper adopts an in-depth exploratory case study approach, whereby it examines over time 
the various political interventions to encourage investment in R & D activities.  It is common 
to see criticism of case studies as a research method, with some viewing the method to be a 
non-scientific approach to undertaking research.  Notwithstanding this view, case study 
research is utilised extensively in academic enquiry in traditional social science disciplines as 
well as practice-oriented fields.  When undertaking case study, the design and analysis 
considerations are of prime importance, more so often than the description of events or the 
scenario under review.  As Yin states,16 the need for a case study arises out of the desire to 
understand complex social phenomena and allows investigators to retain the holistic and 
meaningful characteristics of real-life events. 
The research question this paper seeks to answer is: What can we learn from NZ’s political 
intervention experience with intervening to encourage investment in R & D activities?  As 
noted above, to answer this research question necessitates an in-depth exploratory case study 
analysis be undertaken.   
Overall, this paper will take an historical review, drawing substantially upon the earlier 
contributions of Sawyer17 and Robinson.18  It will also evaluate subsequent developments, 
including the recently enacted R & D tax credit scheme in 2019.  The remainder of this paper 
is organised as follows.  Section 2 provides the overall background to the R & D interventions 
 
16  Robert K Yin, Case Study Research and Applications: Design and Methods, (Sage Publications, 6th ed. 
2017). 
17  Adrian Sawyer, “Reflections on providing tax incentives for research and development: New Zealand at the 
cross roads” (2005) 8(1) Journal of Australian Taxation, 111-149. 
18  Alex Robinson, The rise and fall of R&D tax credits in New Zealand: The practitioner’s perspective, 
Bachelor of Commerce Honours Research Project, University of Canterbury (2009).  
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in NZ, along with comments on the early review of their impact and effectiveness.  Section 3 
draws these reviews together and explores the issue of the R & D inventions being ‘hostage’ 
to political ideologies rather than necessarily to work to stimulate NZ’s level of R & D 
investment to meet at least the average for the OECD member countries.  Section 4 sets out the 
concluding observations, limitations of the research and suggests some areas for future study. 
II. BACKGROUND AND REVIEW 
Much has been written globally about R & D fiscal incentives, whether it be through tax credits, 
grants or other forms of support.  This comes from various perspectives, including econometric 
analysis, and political science.  It is not the intention of this paper to undertake a further 
comprehensive review.  Rather, as a single country case study, this section of the paper will 
briefly review the contributions to the R & D literature from a NZ perspective.   
Business expenditure on R & D in NZ is low in comparison to other OECD countries.  In an 
OECD working paper in 2017, the author comments:19 
“New Zealand’s R&D expenditure, especially by the business sector, is low as a share 
of GDP ... While it might be reasonable for New Zealand to aspire to a lower level of 
R&D spending than leading OECD countries due to its industry structure, size and 
location, its productivity is hampered by its low rate of R&D expenditure … .” 
One attempt to redress this was the establishment of Callaghan Innovation in 2013 to be a 
source of funding for R & D grants; this development is explored further in the next section of 
 
19  Andrew Barker, “Improving Productivity in New Zealand’s Economy” (2017) OECD Economics 
Department Working Papers No 1419, at 15 (emphasis added). 
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the paper.  Deakins et al, in a series of interviews with technology-based small firms (TBSFs) 
in NZ, concluded:20 
“Direct government support for TBSFs has been through mechanisms such as 
technology grants and vouchers targeted at R & D and later stage growth and project 
development.  Whilst such grants have been welcomed as being valuable by our 
entrepreneur respondents, they have not been without criticism.  Some technology 
entrepreneurs expressed a preference for R&D tax credits rather than direct grants 
whilst others perceived grant mechanisms as too bureaucratic, discouraging some 
firms that would have had eligible projects from applying.  Grants often carry high 
levels of deadweight (the investment in R&D would have occurred without financial 
support, perhaps at a later time or at a lower level), arguably resulting in some firms 
becoming too grant dependent, so the value of relatively high levels of state expenditure 
could be questioned.  However, this would require a full economic evaluation to provide 
an informed opinion.” 
Le and Jaffe provide further empirical evidence of the effect of R & D subsidy on innovation 
in NZ.21  The authors’ study examines the impact of government subsidy through R & D grants 
on innovation output for firms in New Zealand.  The authors had access to a large database that 
links administrative and tax data with survey data, and found that R & D grants have a stronger 
effect on more novel innovation than on incremental innovation.  They also found that larger, 
project-based grants, are more effective at promoting innovation than smaller, non-project-
 
20  David Deakins, David North and Jo Bensemann, “Paradise lost? The case of technology-based small firms 
in New Zealand in the post-global financial crisis economic environment” (2015) 17(1-2) Venture Capital 
129, at 147 (emphasis added). 
21  Trinh Le and Adam B Jaffe, “The impact of R & D subsidy on innovation: evidence from New Zealand 
firms” (2017) 26(5) Economics of Innovation and New Technology 429. 
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specific grants.  Interestingly, there was little evidence to support the proposition that R & D 
grants have differential effects between smaller (<50 employees) and larger firms. 
Most recently, Nakatani provides a positive early analysis on the potential impact of the 
recently enacted R & D tax credit scheme.  Nakatani concludes his analysis as follows:22 
“Analysing New Zealand firms’ profitability in terms of productivity enhancers, we 
find the importance of R&D tax incentive and investment.  The results indicate that the 
R&D tax credit, currently planned by the new government, can improve the 
performance of New Zealand firms.” 
Several studies offer longitudinal analyses of the approaches taken to supporting R & D in NZ.  
The following discussion necessarily provides highlights only and readers are encouraged to 
read these studies for more detail.   
Sawyer23 provides a background to NZ’s approach to supporting R & D up to 2005.  New 
Zealand was described in the OECD’s 1996 report24 as the OECD member providing the least 
R&D tax support.  Indeed, in the mid-2000s, NZ remained near the bottom of the OECD list.  
Under rules introduced in 2001, businesses were allowed a full (100 percent) deduction for 
most expenditure on R & D, except to the extent that an asset is created (linking the deduction 
to the ‘research’ and ‘development’ concepts used in financial accounting standards).  
Businesses were also expected to apply tests used for financial accounting reporting purposes 
to determine eligible expenditure.  The Private Sector R & D Liaison Group was working with 
the NZ Government to provide clear definitions of R & D.  A positive outcome of this work 
 
22  Ryota Nakatani, “Firm performance and corporate finance in New Zealand” (2019) 26(13) Applied 
Economics Letters, 1118, at 1123 (emphasis added). 
23  Sawyer (n 17). 
24  OECD, Fiscal Measures to Promote R&D and Innovation (1996) 25-26. 
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led to clearer definitions in the ITA 1994 (as it then was).  New Zealand’s approach at this 
time, as Sawyer comments, was to:25 
“…prefer R & D subsidies (or grants) over tax credits and incentives to steer research 
to particular goals and avoid jeopardising the neutrality of the tax system. This most 
recent approach of providing grants places the New Zealand Government and officials 
in the role of ‘picking winners’, which introduces the risk that factors other than the 
potential future value and contribution of the R&D, such as political bias, will be major 
factors in the decision-making process.” 
Sawyer’s research concludes that:26 
“[t]he tax credit is also preferable in terms of incurring the lowest level of compliance 
costs. Notwithstanding this evidence, the New Zealand Government and officials prefer 
a grants scheme, the opposite of what the research indicates is preferred by businesses.” 
Robinson’s research27 was timely in that it provided insights collected from interviews with 
tax practitioners who had experienced the implementation of NZ’s first tax credit scheme for 
R & D.  Regrettably this scheme only lasted for one year (being the ‘victim’ of politics).  
Robinson examines the R & D tax credit from the perspective of a behaviour changing 
intervention.  He concludes:28 
“The overall finding for this paper is that the success or failure of behaviour changing 
efforts cannot be assessed within a single business year. Although there was little 
indication that the R&D tax credit had influenced new R&D from its introduction, the 
 
25  Sawyer (n 17), at 143 (emphasis added). 
26  Sawyer (n 17), at 148 (emphasis added). 
27  Robinson (n 18). 
28  Robinson (n 18), at 5-6 (emphasis added). 
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interviewees all stressed the fact that there had not been enough time for business 
managers to see the financial benefits derived from this credit and to further have the 
funds to engage in new projects.” 
Robinson traverses the process by which the R & D tax credit concept was developed and 
eventually became law.  The process commenced in 2006 with a discussion document and an 
issues paper being released.29  Draft legislation was introduced in 2007, becoming law with 
effect from the 2008-9 income year.  The tax credit was subsequently repealed with the change 
in government following the 2008 General Election.   
Robinson reports on several of the interviewees comments:30 
“When asked about grant funding as another mechanic for creating R&D, responses 
were fairly sceptical. Grants were typically seen as a minimum level of government 
investment, or as an inferior substitute: 
‘Grants seem quite difficult to get… it seems more hit and miss… with R&D if 
you’re undertaking R&D and it fits the statutory definition you should be eligible 
and so you receive an amount. But I guess with grants you have to be accepted.’ 
A public accountant 
‘Grants are handouts and will always be limited in availability, whereas a tax 
credit places the incentive and control on the researcher who must initially fund 
it themselves. Nothing focuses the drive for success more than having one's own 
 
29  Michael Cullen and Peter Dunne, Business Tax Review: A discussion document, (2006, Wellington, NZ: 
Policy Advice Division of the Inland Revenue Department); and Policy Advice Division of the Inland 
Revenue Department. & New Zealand Treasury, R&D tax credits – an officials’ issues paper on matters 
arising from the Business Tax Review (2006, Wellington, NZ: Policy Advice Division of the Inland Revenue 
Department). 
30  Robinson (n 18), at 37-38. 
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money at risk. Hence a tax credit is a far stronger mechanism for driving 
innovation than grants.’ 
A public accountant 
‘As far as companies are concerned, if they can get a contribution for the research 
they’re doing, great. And from that perspective if it’s a grant or credit it shouldn’t 
really matter. But it’s really a question of what’s the allocation method of public 
funds and I’m not sure that you get the best outcome with [grants] – because then 
you effectively have got people that know how to get the grants will get the grants 
and people that don’t know won’t get them.’ 
A public accountant” 
A further major finding of Robinson’s study is that the success of the R & D tax credit could 
not be effectively evaluated as it required much longer than one year of operation to undertake 
such an evaluation.  Thus this qualitative-based approach to the research was the only feasible 
method with the absence of longitudinal quantitative data. 
A recent review of NZ’s R & D tax incentives and grants was undertaken by Afram in 2016.31  
Afram applies Adam Smiths’ principles or cannons of taxation (equity, certainty, convenience 
and efficiency),32 as a criteria to evaluate: the one year R & D tax credit; the more recent 
cashing out of losses; and the Callaghan Innovation’ administered grants.  Her analysis ranks 
 
31  Dina Afram, “A Review of New Zealand’s Past& Current R&D Incentives and How They Reflect Adam 
Smith’s (1776) Principles of Good Taxation: An Exploratory Study”, A Thesis Submitted to University of 
Canterbury of Christchurch in Fulfilment of the Requirements for the Master of Commerce with Honours 
Degree in Taxation at the University of Canterbury, Christchurch NZ (2016). 
32  See Adam Smith, An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations, in Edwin Cannan (ed), 
(London: Methuen, 1950 edition). 
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the tax credits and cashing out of tax losses from R & D activities as superior to the grants 
approach.  
A common theme throughout these studies is the significant role that political interventions 
have had in shaping R & D incentive policy, including a number of undesirable side effects, 
such as creating uncertainty and wastage of resources.  The next section of the paper reviews 
these political interventions and their impact. 
III. FISCAL SUPPORT FOR R & D – A HOSTAGE TO POLITICS? 
A R & D tax incentives - a political football? 
As has been indicated in the previous section, government policy with respect to R & D 
incentives has changed dramatically on numerous occasions over the last twenty years or so.  
This has created a great deal of uncertainty for businesses, and has done little to advance NZ 
up the OECD table in terms of its investment in R & D activities (especially private sector 
investment).  
As discussed earlier, until the latter part of the 2000s, NZ’s principal approach was to allow for 
full deductibility of R & D expenditure that met criteria specified in tax legislation and in 
financial accounting standards.  As areas of black hole expenditure were identified, legislative 
clarifications were made in most instances to ensure the expenditure was deducible for tax 
purposes.  Rather than provide direct support through the tax system, as recommended by 
private sector organisations, researchers and businesses themselves, the NZ Government 
persevered with a grants-based system (through Callaghan Innovation – see the discussion in 
the next subsection), deciding that it (and officials) were best placed to ‘pick winners’.  The 




The first significant change was the introduction of the 15 percent tax credit with effect from 
the 2008-9 income year by the then Labour-led Government.  This credit was aimed at 
incentivising NZ businesses to invest in R & D in order to correct an under-investment trend, 
stimulate the economy, improve productivity and raise international competitiveness.  It also 
was seen as an opportunity to bring NZ into line with countries who already offered tax 
incentives for R&D – especially Australia’s 125 percent accelerated deduction.  The 
legislation, set out in subpart LH of the Income Tax Act 2007 (ITA 2007), effectively provided 
NZ businesses with a 15 percent tax credit on eligible expenditure.  As Robinson indicates, this 
scheme was largely supported by advisers to businesses that invest in R & D activities.33  
With the change of government in November 2008, this resulted in the R&D credit being 
repealed from the 2009-10 income year onwards.  The reasoning given by the National-led 
Government (which would usually be seen as pro-business), was to fund its preferred tax 
regimes involving personal income tax cuts. The National-led Government claimed that it was 
appropriate to cease the R & D tax credit as it was unclear whether new R & D would be 
developed.  If so, then the credit was simply rewarding R & D that would have been conducted 
irrespective of the credit.  Important questions needed to be answered, such as ‘Had businesses 
been responding to the credit by engaging in new R & D, or did they, perhaps, simply reclassify 
other expenditure that could qualify for the credit’?  Whatever was the case, abolishing the 
credit means these propositions could never be effectively tested.  Furthermore, a one year 
period is too short to evaluate the effectiveness of the tax credit or otherwise.  In effect, the 
National-led Government had ‘answered’ its questions without allowing time to determine 
whether they were correct.  
 
33  See Robinson (n 18). 
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Nothing further happened of significance in the R & D space (other than further clarifications 
concerning black hole expenditure) until 2015 when the National-led Government became 
convinced that the current grants-based scheme was not supporting new businesses.  This was 
not a surprise to those that understand the importance of fiscal stimulus to encourage 
investment in R & D activities.   
Legislation was enacted to allow start-up companies engaging in intensive R & D development 
activities to “cash out” their tax losses for R & D expenditure.  The Taxation (Annual Rates for 
2015–16, Research and Development, and Remedial Matters) Bill was enacted on 24 February 
2016 with effect from the 2015-16 income year.  Under the scheme, R & D start-up companies 
would be able to receive a payment for up to 28 percent (the company tax rate) of their tax 
losses from R & D expenditure in any given year.  To be eligible, the company must be a loss-
making company resident in NZ, with a sufficient proportion of labour expenditure on R & D. 
Research and development expenditure eligible for the measure was more restricted than the R 
& D expenditure that is deductible under sections DB 34 and DB 35 of ITA 2007.  The amount 
of losses that could be cashed out were initially capped at $500,000 for the 2015–16 year, 
increasing by $300,000 over the next five years, to $2 million.   
In a Special Report on the legislation issued by IR, the following comment is made:34 
“A cashed-out loss can be thought of as an interest-free loan from the Government to 
be repaid from the taxpayer’s future income; it is intended to provide a cash flow timing 
benefit only. In economic terms, repayment of cashed out losses will occur when a 
taxpayer pays tax on net income that would otherwise have been sheltered by the cashed 
out losses. An earlier repayment will also be triggered in certain circumstances. 
 
34  Inland Revenue, “Cash out” of research and development tax losses: A Special Report, (Policy and Strategy 
IR, April 2016), at 2 (emphasis added). 
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Triggers for the early repayment of amounts cashed out include the sale of research and 
development assets, liquidation or migration of the company, and the sale of the 
company. The early repayment will be effected via a new R&D repayment tax. Where 
a cashed out loss is required to be repaid early, a new deduction will reinstate the loss, 
which will be available to offset future income.” 
Thus this cashing out of losses is effectively a repayable loan once the company becomes 
profitable and pays tax (similar in some respects to student loans for tertiary study, albeit there 
is a greater impact on wellbeing of the debt holder).35  With its very limited application, this 
measure would be welcomed by some businesses but is not relevant to most involved in R & 
D activities.  
With a change in government following the 2017 General Election, the new Labour-led 
Government was quick to reintroduce a tax credit, based initially on its earlier 2008-9 regime, 
but with some differences that emerged through the consultation process.  Concurrently, the 
new government announced that its goal was to increase total R & D as a percentage of GDP 
to 2 percent (from the then 1.25 percent).  In order to reach this target a significant amount of 
growth is expected to come from NZ business expenditure on R & D.  The R&D tax incentive 
(effectively a tax credit) was the primary mechanism for achieving this.  In the Impact 
Statement accompanying the proposal, the Labour-led Government observed:36 
 
35  For an overview of the impact of student loans repayments on wellbeing, see Sylvia Nissen, Bronwyn 
Hayward and Ruth McManus, “Student debt and wellbeing: a research agenda” (2019) 14(2) Kōtuitui: New 
Zealand Journal of Social Sciences Online, 245-256. 
36  See Megan Woods and, Stuart Nash, Coversheet: Research & Development Tax Incentive: Impact Statement 
(2017), at 2 (emphasis added).  This statement was supported by personnel from MBIE, The Treasury and 
IR.  Inland Revenue subsequently issued a series of briefing papers; see IR, Research and Development Tax 
Credit: Policy reports and briefing notes (September 2018).  See also, IR, Research and development tax 
incentive: Guidance (May 2019), which provides in-depth guidance and a series of useful flowcharts that 
explain the core aspects of the new tax credit incentive. 
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“New Zealand currently delivers R&D subsidies to businesses through Callaghan 
Innovation. The bulk of these subsidies are delivered through Growth Grants to 
firms that have stable, high-intensity R&D programmes. However, these grants are 
unavailable to the large majority of firms that are currently undertaking R&D or 
may undertake R&D in the future. While these remaining firms can obtain Project 
Grants, these are targeted at a specific type of R&D expenditure and involve 
significant compliance/transaction costs (i.e., expenditure of time and resources) for 
firms.” 
The new tax credit was expected to initially cost the government $NZ1.02 billion for each of 
the first four years, over and above the $NZ0.53 billion on grants paid through Callaghan 
Innovation.  Growth Grants (the current funding mechanism via Callaghan Innovation) for 
business R&D would be phased out with the introduction of the R&D tax credit.  The Taxation 
(Research and Development Tax Credits) Act 2019 amended the ITA 2007, along with other 
statutes, with specific provisions for the 2020 income year and new provisions for the 2021 
and subsequent years.  
As part of a transition, in order to reduce the risk of uncertainty and reduction in business 
expenditure on R & D, the NZ Government would: 
• Educate and develop appropriate guidelines so businesses understand how to claim the 
R&D tax credit; 
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• Allow a transition period of two years during which existing Growth Grant recipients 
may continue to claim a Growth Grant through Callaghan Innovation (instead of the R & 
D tax credit);37 
• Provide clear information on transition arrangements for Growth Grant recipients to 
ensure a smooth transition to the R & D tax credit that supports businesses to maintain 
and grow their R&D over time; and 
• Develop an appropriate implementation strategy to ensure the successful uptake of the 
R&D tax credit. 
The other risk of the R&D Tax Incentive (tax credit) is recharacterisation of business-as-usual 
expenditure.  This risk would be managed by: 
• A robust definition of eligible R&D for taxation (and other relevant) legislation to create 
a clear boundary between R&D and non-R&D; and  
• Audit of claims, including in-year approval of the R&D. 
Other types of grants provided by Callaghan Innovation will remain, leaving a mix of tax 
credits, cashing out of losses and grants approach to stimulate investment in R & D activities.  
While initially proposed to be 12.5 percent, submissions received during the consultation 
process encouraged to the NZ Government to accept the rate should be 15 percent, which is a 
welcome outcome showing the importance of engaging in the consultation process. 
In order to claim the credit the business must first determine if it is an eligible person (as defined 
in the legislation), will the activities be considered to be eligible R & D activity (as defined in 
 
37  See further material provided by Callaghan Innovation, Managing the Transition from Growth Grants to the 
R & D Tax Incentive (2019). 
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the legislation), is the expenditure eligible for the credit, as well as taking into account practical 
considerations, such as registration with IR, and providing a supplemental R & D return 
following filing of their tax return.  The process for year one of the regime (which ends 31 
March 2020 for most taxpayers) is transitional, with a change in process for the subsequent 
years (assuming the scheme remains if there is a change in government following the 2020 
general election).  In essence IR is the gatekeeper for approving expenditure that leads to the 
granting of the R & D tax credit.38  
The enactment of the Taxation (Research and Development Tax Credits) Act 2019 is not the 
latest development in this area.  The Taxation (KiwiSaver, Student Loans and Remedial 
Matters) Bill 2019 (the 2019 Bill), currently before the Finance and Expenditure Select 
Committee (FEC), proposes further changes to the new tax credit.  In the Commentary on the 
2019 Bill, it states that:39 
“The Bill proposes an amendment to make refundable R & D tax credits available to 
more firms. It is proposed that the existing corporate eligibility criteria, wage intensity 
test, and $255,000 cap be removed and replaced with a payroll-tax based cap. It is also 
proposed that entities that derive tax exempt income (other than levy bodies, and 
 
38  Inland Revenue, at the time of writing, is developing a form of advice notification, potentially similar to the 
new short process rulings, for those businesses seeking approval of their R & D expenditure for the tax credit.  
Short process rulings are a mechanism for individuals and organisations, with an annual gross income of 
$NZ20 million or less, to apply for a binding ruling on how a tax law applies to a situation (any joint 
applicants must each have an annual gross income of $NZ20 million or less).  Such rulings are likely to be 
suitable for most commercial arrangements or business transactions that may have an uncertain tax treatment.  
However, IR may decline to make as ruling.  A short process ruling is confidential to the applicants named 
in the ruling. If a person chooses to follow the ruling, IR is bound by it, providing the information the person 
provided IR is correct and complete.  A short process ruling will take about 6 weeks and costs $NZ2,000 
(including GST).  This needs to be paid when a person submits their application. A tax invoice will be issued 
to the main applicant. 
39  Stuart Hash, Taxation (KiwiSaver, Student Loans, and Remedial Matters) Bill: Commentary on the Bill (June 
2019), at 27 and 36 (emphasis added).  For further discussion, see Virginia Ginnane, “R&D Tax Incentive: 
Refundable Tax Credits extended to more businesses” (2019) Taxation Today (September) 4-5. 
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claimants that only receive exempt income from certain intercompany and foreign 
dividends) be ineligible for the R & D tax credit. … 
The Bill also proposes an amendment to allow the Commissioner to adjust a person’s 
R & D tax credit claim upwards if the person has initiated the disputes process through 
issuing a notice of proposed adjustment (NOPA) within four months of filing their 
income tax return or a year after their income tax return due date.” 
Furthermore, there is a proposed amendment to prevent a person from challenging the 
Commissioner of Inland Revenue’s decisions made for the pilot approval scheme and 
expenditure exceeding the $120 million cap.  Other changes proposed relate to R & D 
Certifiers, and adjustments for joint ventures involved in R & D investment activities.  
This is not the complete story as to the political nature of R & D support – the Callaghan 
Innovation-administered grants schemes also needs to be reviewed.  This is the subject of the 
next subsection. 
B Callaghan Innovation – a focus on ‘picking winners’ through the provision of grants40 
Callaghan Innovation was established following a June 2012 NZ Cabinet decision to set up an 
advanced technology institute (ATI) with the main objective to support science and 
technology-based innovation and its commercialisation by businesses, primarily in the 
manufacturing and services sectors, to improve their growth and competitiveness.  As an ATI, 
Callaghan Innovation initially employed 320 scientists from Industrial Research Limited 
(IRL), a Crown Research Institute (CRI) that was disestablished as Callaghan Innovation was 
 




established.  Callaghan Innovation also administers the Ministry of Business, Innovation and 
Employment’s (MBIE’s) co-funded research portfolio.  
Legislation was enacted establishing the organisation as a new statutory Crown entity in 
December 2012.41 The new organisation, with the permanent name of Callaghan Innovation, 
commenced operations from 1 February 2013, and is located in the Auckland, Wellington 
(including the Hutt Valley) and Canterbury regions.42 
Callaghan Innovation offers four types of grants to NZ businesses: student grants; getting 
started grants; project grants; and growth grants.  Student Grants are available for NZ-based 
businesses that want to: 
• Access NZ undergraduate and postgraduate students who can assist them in their R&D 
projects; 
• Gain access to the latest thinking and fresh talent at a minimal cost; 
• Train and mentor a future employee for them or the sector; and 
• Build links with New Zealand universities. 
The types of Student Grants are as follows: 
 R&D Experience Grant: A 10-week internship designed as work experience during 
the student’s summer break or at completion of the student’s study. The student is 
expected to help you with an R&D project. The grant is available part of the year; 
 
41  See Callaghan Innovation Act 2012. 
42  See further: https://www.callaghaninnovation.govt.nz/about-us/publications-and-documents. In its 
April/May 2016 newsletter, NZIFST Careers reports on the success of two tertiary students working under 
a student grant over the summer of 2015-16; see “Undergraduates gain experience through Callaghan 
Innovation R&D Experience Grants”, Food New Zealand, (April/May 2016), at 40-41. 
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 R&D Fellowship Grant: Designed to provide funding support for students to 
undertake a PhD, or the research component of a master’s degree, which is aimed at 
solving a technical or scientific problem for your business. The business will get access 
to the latest thinking and knowledge through the student’s university supervisor and 
build ongoing links between your business and the university. The grant is available 
year-round; and 
 R&D Career Grant: An internship designed to bridge the first six months of 
employment – providing work experience for recent PhD or masters graduate students. 
The student is expected to help businesses with an R&D project. The grant is available 
year-round. 
Getting Started Grants are available for NZ-based businesses that want to: 
 Launch their R&D activities to create a competitive edge; 
 Navigate through R&D roadblocks – whether its troubleshooting, basic prototyping, 
project planning, technical feasibility studies, development of an Intellectual Property 
strategy or determining product specifications and user requirements; and  
 Access technical expertise to support businesses in taking your development in the right 
direction. 
A business that is successful with this type of grant will: 
 Receive 40 percent of their eligible R&D project costs, up to $5,000 (based on a 
quotation); 
 Only receive funding for R&D undertaken in NZ; and 
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 Receive a one-off payment on completion of the project. 
For Project Grants, in addition to strict application criteria, these grants are designed to help 
businesses: 
 Build their R&D expertise by giving the business an opportunity to push the boundaries 
and uncover new scientific or technical knowledge and understanding; 
 Break new ground in an R&D project for the development of new or substantially 
improved devices, products, processes, systems or services; 
 Develop the business into a stable and substantial R&D performer; or 
 Grow their investment in R&D. 
The business will: 
 Typically receive 40 percent of their eligible R&D project costs; reducing for large 
projects, or when the business has had multiple grants; 
 Only receive funding for R&D done in New Zealand (unless pre-approved); and 
 Receive payment in arrears (monthly or quarterly). 
For Growth Grants (which are being phased out with the new R & D tax credit),43 their 
objective is to increase NZ businesses’ investment in R&D to support long term economic 
growth.  These grants are intended to be a rules-based, market led incentive for increasing R&D 
 
43  Callaghan Innovation provides guidance as to how the transitional process works; see Callaghan 




investment in businesses that are experienced in investing in R&D.  To have eligible R&D 
expenditure a business must have: 
• Incurred expenditure on an eligible R&D activity; and 
• Expenditure must not be in the list of general or specific inclusions. 
The guidelines are based on the ministerial direction but include additional clarification. 
Businesses are encouraged to discuss any matters with Callaghan Innovation directly to ensure 
they know what activities are eligible for financial support. 
Callaghan Innovation’s operations have not all been ‘plain sailing’.  In 2014, Callaghan 
Innovation was a recipient of “the Accomplice Award”, after it was discovered it had been 
providing grants for R & D to transnational companies, many of which were operating from 
tax havens.44  This is an excellent example of the challenges in allowing an institution to 
determine grant recipients when the process lacks full and transparent robustness checks. 
In an evaluation of Callaghan Innovation reported in 2015,45 a significant problem perceived 
by interviewees was the focus of R & D funding on product innovation followed by a lack of 
funding to support later stage commercialisation of products.  This later stage of product and 
market development is excluded from Callaghan Innovation co-funding.  As a consequence, 
this leads to a ‘prototypes-on-a-shelf’ approach.  Applicants also found the process time 
consuming, due to the complexity of the application questions, as well as delays in response 
from the funding network of regional funding partners and the government ministry.  Concerns 
 
44  See The Roger Award 2014 (2015). 
45  Nick Kearns and William Beale, “Show me the Money: Perspectives on Applying for Government 
Research and Development Co-funding” (2015) Occasional & Discussion Paper Series No 2 (Unitec).  
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over the use and role of consultants were also expressed by applicants.  The study was carried 
out during the establishment period of Callaghan Innovation. 
What can be said going forward?  The next subsection attempts to provide some ‘crystal ball’ 
insights. 
C What about the immediate future? 
As at the time of writing the prior discussion reflects the state of play with respect to the 
political football of R & D incentives, focusing on government utilisation (or otherwise) of the 
tax system to deliver its fiscal support.  The current scheme, at the time of writing, is nearing 
the end of its first transitional year of operation.  From April 2020 the full regime comes into 
play, with the role of Callaghan Innovation reducing as the Growth Grants it administers are 
fully phased out by the end of the 2021 income year.  
What is clear is that businesses cannot expect certainty through continuance of any particular 
R & D incentive scheme, given the frequent changes following changes in government.  As a 
consequence, NZ’s R & D performance is being hampered and it will be some time, if ever, 
that the current government’s goal of 2 percent of GDP being invested into R & D activities 
eventuates.  Much irreplaceable experience, and sizable compliance and administrative costs 
were incurred, for the one year 2008-09 tax credit scheme.  The current scheme cannot be 
permitted to suffer a similar fate; however, only time will tell.   
While it is not possible as at the time of writing to predict the outcome of the next general 
election, many pollsters are forecasting that a Labour-led Government will be returned, 
notwithstanding that the National Party has the most support of any party in this polling.  
Should this eventuate, then the risk of significant change to the R & D tax credit regime is low, 
assuming NZ’s economy does not go into recession.  With a change to a National-led 
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Government, based on past form, the risk of intervention cannot be ruled out.  In order to give 
NZ businesses a reasonable chance to increase their investment in R & D, and to evaluate the 
success of the regime, tinkering should be avoided other than to make remedial changes to 
support the intention of the R & D tax credit.  Political party manifestos could make for 
interesting reading later in 2020. 
IV. CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS 
This paper has sought to traverse around twenty years of government-based support, or 
otherwise, for encouraging R & D investment in NZ.  It notes that following a very timid 
approach up to the early 2000s of clarifying what expenditure is deductible for tax purposes 
(including reducing black hole expenditure), efforts were made to introduce targeted grants.  
Here officials through a government agency would be charged with ‘picking winners’ by 
allocating various types of grants following specified criteria.  Like most types of research 
funding in NZ, the environment is one that encourages competitive applications for funding 
from a limited pool of funding, underpinned by a neoliberal philosophy.  New Zealand does 
not have a comprehensive CGT (where capital losses can be offset against capital gains) and 
there are no indications that a CGT will be revisited for the foreseeable future.46  
More generally, empirical evidence is vital to assessing the outcomes from R & D inputs, 
including funding, with ‘politics’ having a significant influence on innovation funding.  Sarnoff 
observes that: 47  
 
46  See further the Tax Working Group’s Final Report recommending a CGT and the NZ Government’s 
response at: https://taxworkinggroup.govt.nz/your-homepage-your-frontpage-make-it-count. 
47  Joshua Sarnoff, “The Likely Mismatch between Federal Research & Development Funding and Desired 




“… scholars and policy makers lack substantial amounts of empirical information 
regarding the outputs to R&D inputs that would help to determine what innovation-
funding form choices work best in particular situations for desired innovation goals. 
Theories of innovation funding are highly dependent on such missing information. Even 
if we obtained the missing information and revised these theories in light of it, the 
political economy of innovation funding would cause us routinely to deviate from what 
our theory suggests would work best to achieve specific goals.” 
Following work undertaken for the Royal Society of NZ, subsequently published by Sawyer in 
2005,48 along with other researchers, the pressure to improve NZ’s low ranking in the OECD 
for R & D investment as a percentage of GDP increased to the point that government action 
was taken.  This led to the Labour-led Government’s ill-fated one year tax credit for the 2008-
9 year that was repealed by the incoming National-led Government.  We will never be able to 
assess whether this scheme would have increased R & D investment significantly.  This was a 
lost opportunity, as Robinson observed.49  Grants remained the main source of funding, along 
with provision from 2016 for enabling new firms with tax losses due to R & D investment to 
cash out those losses by way of a government loan, repayable when they became profitable and 
paid income tax.  Neither the grants or the cashing out of losses were options for supporting 
most R & D activities by established business, so further support was needed.   
With the incoming Labour-led Government in 2017, the second tax credit scheme was 
developed, with application from the 2019-20 income year.  Similar to its predecessor, this 
scheme supports a broad range of businesses and is the main mechanism to meet the current 
Government’s goal of R & D expenditure being 2 percent of GDP.  Phasing out of the Growth 
 
48  Sawyer (n 17). 
49  Robinson (n 18). 
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Grants, administered by Callaghan Innovation, is occurring, which places greater emphasis on 
tax credits to stimulate R & D investment.  It is too early at this stage to evaluate the 
effectiveness of this new tax credit incentive, including whether it will move NZ’s investment 
in R & D activities close to the NZ Government’s target of 2 percent of GDP.  One possible 
challenge to its continued existence will be the outcome of the forthcoming September 2020 
General Election should there be a change to a National-led Government.  
The research question this paper sought to answer is: What can we learn from NZ’s political 
intervention experience with intervening to encourage investment in R & D activities?  As 
noted above, this necessitated an in-depth exploratory case study analysis of the support 
provided by government to R & D investment in NZ.   
What this analysis reveals is that R & D incentives have been highly political, and ‘kicked 
around’ by various governments as they prioritise their tax policies and approach to 
encouraging R &D investment.  One major takeaway is that the matter of R & D incentives is 
too important to leave to the whim of politicians.  Such incentives are vital to the success of 
New Zealand Inc., and in this regard any change should require political consensus based upon 
independent analysis and input from officials, economists and tax experts.  Perhaps a minimum 
period of operation is necessary before any significant change is made so as to allow sufficient 
time for review and analysis.  A major challenge would be to get cross party support for the 
legislation.  Both possibilities are unlikely given that one Parliament is unable to bind another 
in legislative terms and philosophically the two major parties appear to remain divided over R 
& D investment support.  This paper’s analysis suggests that the political efforts to date have 
done little to support economic growth through enhanced investment in R & D activities.  In 
many respects they have served to hinder, especially so for smaller businesses.  The biggest 
concern is a lack of stability and certainty for businesses. 
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This paper has a number of limitations.  The first is that at the time of writing the latest regime 
is approximately a year into its operation and it is too early to evaluate its effectiveness.  
Furthermore, if there should be a change in government at next election then what might occur?  
Second, this paper takes an outsider’s perspective; the author is not part of political decision-
making process nor an official that has access to confidential information and data.  Third, and 
more generally, NZ’s absence of a CGT may in fact serve as a ‘hand brake’ on the level of 
investment in R & D activities, as capital losses are unable to be offset against any form of 
(capital) gain.  
In terms of future research, an evaluation of the latest scheme in two to three years would 
enable a preliminary comment on its effectiveness in moving NZ closer to the current 
Government’s R & D target of 2 percent of GDP.  Just prior to the last General Election in 
2017, Labour Party leader Jacinda Ardern, stated that the neoliberal model has ‘failed’ and 
needs to be changed.50  While there is little evidence of this intervention to date, we may see 
announcements of specific interventions in the lead up to, or following the next general 
election, depending on the outcome.  More specifically, following the 2020 General Election, 
analysis of whether NZ has the right mix of support (grants, cashing out of losses and tax 
credits) can be undertaken.  
 
 
50  Henry Cooke, Jacinda Ardern says neoliberalism has failed (17 September 2017) Radio New Zealand, 
available at: https://www.stuff.co.nz/national/politics/96739673/jacinda-ardern-says-neoliberalism-has-
failed. 
